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This paper presents an analysis of the early Charter cases dealing with
civil commitment and compulsory treatment of individuals under
provincial mental health legislation. The author describes two models
for dealing with these issues: the paternalistic model and the social
control model. She argues that Canadian courts have adopted a
paternalistic approach and, as such, have failed to recognize the adversary
relationship between the state and the individual which forms the basis
of involuntary psychiatry. Courts have thus failed to develop the kinds
of procedural protections that are available in the criminal law context.
The author proposes that courts making decisions dealing with civil
mental health issues should rely less on paternalism and recognize the
serious deprivations of liberty at stake for individuals in the mental health
system.
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The power to commit an individual involuntarily to a
psychiatric facility is among the most intrusive of all state powers.
Traditionally, there have been two rationales provided for the state's
authority to involuntarily hospitalize and treat persons with mental
disabilities.2  One rationale is based on the state's obligation to
protect individuals within its jurisdiction who are unable to protect
themselves. This rationale is premised on the individual being
incapable of caring for himself or herself or of making decisions
about his or her own welfare. I will refer to this rationale as the
"paternalistic" model of mental health law. The second rationale for
civil commitment is premised on the state's role in maintaining
public order. The state deprives one individual of liberty in order
to protect the welfare and safety of other members of society. I will
refer to this rationale as the "social control" model of mental health
law.
This paper uses these two models as a conceptual framework
for examining recent developments in mental health jurisprudence.
The paper begins with an attempt to clarify the underlying
1 'The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment" (1953) 6 Res Judicatae 224 at 228.
2 This paper will be limited to the consideration of individuals involuntarily detained in
psychiatric facilities. My focus is on the civil commitment process, but occasional reference
will be made to cases involving individuals detained in psychiatric facilities through the
criminal justice system. The criticisms presented in this paper are limited to involuntary
psychiatry and are not intended to extend to persons who voluntarily seek psychiatric
hospitalization or treatment.
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assumptions of each rationale. Because these models evolved in
American jurisprudence, I will illustrate the implications of a court
adopting one rationale over the other by contrasting decisions of
the United States' Supreme Court in the area of civil commitment
with decisions dealing with forced treatment. I then move on to
consider the emerging Canadian jurisprudence on mental health law
under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.3 I will argue
that Canadian courts have been overly reliant on a paternalistic
model of mental health law and that such reliance has led to the
under-development of procedural protections for individuals facing
involuntary commitment.
H. PATERNALISM AND SOCIAL CONTROL
The distinction between a paternalistic justification for civil
commitment and some sort of state coercive authority to detain an
individual in order to protect others is a very important one in
mental health case law. How a court perceives the justification for
commitment and forced treatment will often determine the result
reached in a particular dispute.
A paternalistic model of civil commitment justifies involuntary
hospitalization on the basis of preventing harm to the individual
involved. It assumes that all parties involved share a common
interest, i.e., the best interest of the incompetent person. In the
paternalistic model, everyone is perceived to be working towards the
same end. Courts using a paternalistic model give little attention to
individual rights and the consequential development of procedural
protections because "rights" are considered important only when
there is a perceived conflict between the state and the individual.
Once a court accepts this rationale for involuntary
hospitalization or forced treatment, it must determine who should
decide what is in the incompetent person's best interest. The
assumption is made that, if the individual involved is "mentally ill,"
the psychiatrist has the expertise to make decisions about the
person's best interest. The issue is thus constructed primarily as a
Part I of the Constitution Ac; 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
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medical one. Both the legislatures and the courts delegate extensive
authority to the psychiatric profession to determine what is best for
the individual.4
A social control model, on the other hand, justifies
involuntary hospitalization on the basis of a risk of harm to other
members of the community. Because the state is acting to deprive
one person of liberty for the benefit of others, conflicting interests
are likely to be identified and more concern may be given to
protecting the rights of the individual facing commitment, usually in
the form of procedural protections. Further, because of the
adversarial nature of the relationship between the individual and the
state and thus the similarities to criminal law, the courts are more
likely to recognize their own competence to develop procedural
protections for the individual.
The distinction between these two models in mental health
case law originated in United States jurisprudence. In the United
States, each state has jurisdiction over criminal law (referred to as
the police power), as well as a residual parens patriae power to
protect those within its jurisdiction who are unable to protect
themselves. Prior to the 1960s, the parens patriae rationale typified
the approach to mental health law in the United States. It was not
until the dawning of the civil rights era that American courts began
4 This paper takes no position on the value of particular doctors or psychiatric treatments
in individual cases. However, because both the social control and the paternalistic models are
based in part on claims that psychiatrists hold expertise in certain matters relevant to legal
decisions about commitment and treatment, it is important to be aware that this expertise has
its limits. For example, empirical studies have shown psychiatrists to be unable to detect
persons feigning mental illness inside a mental hospital. See D.L Rosenhan, "On Being Sane
in Insane Places" 0973) 179 Science 250. Psychiatrists have also been shown to be highly
influenced by previous diagnoses and unable to predict reliably which individuals present a
danger to themselves or others. See JJ. Cocozza & HJ. Steadman, "The Failure of
Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidence" (1976) 29 Rutgers
L Rev. 1084; AM. Mesnikoff & C.G. Lauterbach, "The Association of Violent Dangerous
Behaviour with Psychiatric Disorders: A Review of the Research Literature" (1975) 3 J. Psych.
& L 415; and B.L Diamond, "he Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness" (1974) 123 U.
Pa. L Rev 439.
The primary treatment used in involuntary psychiatry is medication. While
psychotropic medication may alleviate the symptoms of mental illness in some cases, the side-
effects may be very unpleasant, sometimes permanent, and occasionally fatal. It is virtually
impossible for psychiatrists to predict in advance who will suffer permanent long term damage
from this medication.
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applying the Bill of Rights' in the mental health law context. In
criminal law, the courts were taking a more expansive approach to
the constitutional rights of accused persons.6  This new concern
about rights in criminal law slowly spread into the mental health law
field. Courts began to recognize that civil commitment entails a
serious deprivation of liberty and that "treatment"-oriented
paternalism could not replace due process protections.
The labels of parens patiae power and police power cannot
be transferred directly to Canada because provincial governments,
which have all legislated on mental health issues, have no power to
enact criminal laws, nor do they have power beyond that given to
them by section 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867. However, the
distinction between paternalistic and social control models is still a
useful one in Canadian mental health law since all provinces do
detain individuals on the basis of some form of risk to self and/or to
others. Provinces do have the jurisdiction to make laws to protect
local interests and property and civil rights within the province, and
the courts have held consistently that civil commitment is within
provincial jurisdiction.
8
5 U.S. CONST. amend. I-X.
6 See, for example, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966).
7 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (formerly British North America Ac 1867). The state's
authority to care for individuals unable to care for themselves originated in the concept of the
parens patriae authority of the sovereign and, by section 96 of the Constitution Act 1867, has
also been delegated to superior courts in Canada.
8 See, for example, Fawcett v. A.G. Ontario, [1964] S.C.R. 625 upholding the Ontario
Mental Hospitals Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 236. More recently, in Schneider v. R., [1982] 6 W.W.R.
673 at 697-98, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the province of British Columbia does
have the jurisdiction to impose mandatory treatment (and sometimes hospitalization) for
heroin addicts. The Court held that the Heroin Treatnent Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 166 was
valid provincial law and did not intrude on the federal criminal law power. Dickson J. (as he
then was) indicated that provinces have jurisdiction over issues involving public health under
section 92(16) of the Constitution Ac 1867, which deals with power over matters of a local
or private nature within the province. He stressed that hospitalization under the Act was for
medical, not punitive purposes. He stated:
The compulsory aspects of this intervention are incidental to the effectiveness of
the treatment, narcotic addiction by its very nature being a compulsive condition
over which the individual loses control. Although coercion will obviously play a
significant role, it seems to me that the dominant or most important characteristic
of the Heroin Treatment Act is the treatment and not the coercion ... The
1991]
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III. THE TWO MODELS IN PRACTICE:
AN AMERICAN EXAMPLE
The areas of civil commitment and forced treatment provide
a useful contrast in illustrating the differences ensuing from the
adoption of one model over the other in the context of American
mental health law. In commitment cases, the Supreme Court has
relied primarily on the social control model and insisted on
procedural protections for an individual facing civil commitment.
However, when dealing with forced treatment, an issue that is
unique to the psychiatric context, the paternalistic model is more
evident as the Court delegates to the psychiatric profession the
power to make decisions about who will be forcibly medicated.9
A. Civil Commitment
The watershed case for the rejection of a paternalistic model
was the United States Supreme Court decision in Re Gault.10 While
Gault involved the rights of a juvenile institutionalized in a
detention centre, the case had important implications for future
cases on civil commitment 1 Prior to Gault, the law dealing with
legislature is endeavouring to cure a medical condition, not to punish a criminal
activity.
A province could not pass a law ordering the incarceration of someone it believed might be
dangerous to others unless the source of that danger was medical, such as the power to
quarantine or the power to civilly commit those with an alleged "mental illness."
9 1 will not be reviewing the extensive literature on the dangers (or the potential benefits)
of anti-psychotic medications. This paper does not assume that anti-psychotic medication is
always good nor always bad. Rather, the assumption is that some persons may prefer the
effects of medication to their "mental illness," while others may reasonably prefer the non-
medicated state. The important point is that there is a choice to be made and that the choice
will not always be obvious. See S.J. Morse, "A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against
Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally Disordered" (1982) 70 Calif. L. Rev. 54 and S.J.
Morse, "Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law" (1978) 51
S.C.L Rev. 527.
10 387 U.S. 1, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967) [hereinafter Gault cited to L Ed.].
11 Gault, ibid. has been cited by the Supreme Court in several mental health cases. See,
for example, O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 45 L Ed. 2d 396 at 410 (1975)
[hereinafter O'Connor cited to L Ed.]; Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 60 L. Ed. 323 at 331
[VOL. 29 No. 4
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juvenile offenders had been based on a paternalistic model, focusing
on the rehabilitation of the child rather than on punishment.12 The
premise that any limits on the liberty of the child were for his or
her own interest led the legislatures and courts to disregard due
process requirements. In Gault, the Court described the
paternalistic attitude historically taken towards children and
explained how such paternalism has served to disadvantage its
supposed beneficiaries in the legal system:
The child - essentially good, as they saw it - was to be made "to feel that he is the
object of [the state's] care and solicitude," not that he was under arrest or on trial.
The rules of criminal procedure were therefore altogether inapplicable. The
apparent rigidities, technicalities, and harshness which they observed in both
substantive and procedural criminal law were therefore to be discarded. The idea
of crime and punishment was to be abandoned. The child was to be "treated" and
"rehabilitated" and the procedures, from apprehension through institutionalization,
were to be "clinical" rather than punitiveL"
In the same vein, the Court stated:
Accordingly, the highest motives and most enlightened impulses led to a peculiar
system for juveniles unknown to our law in any comparable context. The
constitutional and theoretical basis for the peculiar system is - to say the least -
debatable. And in practice as we remarked in the Kent case, supra, the results have
not been entirely satisfactory. Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that
unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for
principle and procedure.
1 4
In rejecting a paternalistic approach, the Court held that, because
delinquency proceedings could result in commitment to a state
institution, a liberty interest was at stake and thus that the juvenile
was entitled to due process protections under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The express recognition in Gault that "the essentials of due
process may be a more impressive and more therapeutic attitude
(1979) [hereinafter Addington cited to L Ed.]; and Parham v. JR., 442 U.S. 584, 61 L. Ed. 2d
101 at 117 (1979).
12 This same pattern took place in Canada with the repeal of the paternalistic Juvenile
Delinquents Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. J-3 and the enactment of the Young Offenders Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. Y-1 which focused more on the rights and responsibilities of the young person.
13 Supra, note 10 at 539 (citations omitted).
14 Ibid. at 540-41 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
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[than discretion] so far as the juvenile is concerned" had important
implications for mental health law.15 Gault signified a recognition
on the part of the Court that good intentions cannot overcome the
need for procedural protections.
1 6
Lower courts soon picked up on Gault and applied it to the
mental health context. In Lessard v. Schmidt,17 for example, the
u.s. District Court expanded on Gault and set out further procedural
requirements for involuntary commitment. The Court held that a
person facing commitment has a constitutional right to some kind of
hearing within forty-eight hours of being detained and a right to a
full hearing within ten to fourteen days of being detained. The
Court did not set out the precise nature of the required hearing, but
stated that "due process is not accorded by an ex parte hearing in
which the individual has no meaningful opportunity to be heard
either because of incapacity caused by medication or lack of
counsel.,18 The Court cited Gault in support of the proposition that
due process requires that notice be given sufficiently in advance of
the hearing so that the individual will have a reasonable time to
prepare 9
15 /bid. at 545.
16 For a discussion of the impact on mental health law, see L Newell "America's
Homeless Mentally II: Falling Through a Dangerous Crack" (1989) 15 New Eng. J. Crim. &
Civ. Confin. 277 at 281.
17 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis., 1972), vacated and rem'd on other grounds, 414 US.
473 (1974), judgment reinstated, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and rem'd on
other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), judgment reinstated, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976)
[hereinafter Lessard]. The other grounds were procedural and did not affect the substantive
decision.
18 349 F. Supp. 1078 at 1092, ibid.
19 The Court also held in Lessard, ibid. that an individual in the commitment process has
the right to counsel, including appointed counsel.
754 [vcoi- 29 NO. 4
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In O'Connor v. Donaldson,2 ° the Supreme Court of the
United States applied Gault to the mental health context and again
expressed the view that paternalism could not replace due process
in civil commitment. The Court held that involuntary commitment
to a mental hospital involves a deprivation of liberty and thus that
such commitment cannot take place without due process of law. A
finding of mental illness is not a sufficient basis for commitment if
the individual is not dangerous and could live safely in freedom.
Stevens J., for the Court, stated:
[Tihe mere presence of mental illness does not disqualify a person from preferring
his home to the comforts of an institution. Moreover, while the State may arguably
confine a person to save him from harm, incarceration is rarely if ever a necessary
condition for raising the living standards of those capable of surviving safely in
freedom, on their own or with the help of family or friends.2 1
While the Supreme Court did not spell out exactly what procedures
were required by the due process guarantee, one can imply from
O'Connor that a detained individual has a right to a regular review
of his or her detention in order to determine whether continued
confinement is justified.2 2
20 Supra, note 11. Donaldson had been detained in a state mental hospital for 15 years
despite repeated efforts to obtain his release. On various occasions, friends and outside
agencies had applied for his release and offered to help him adjust to life outside the hospital.
The Superintendent of the hospital, O'Connor, had refused to release him and had refused
him grounds privileges, occupational therapy, and the opportunity to discuss his case.
Evidence at trial showed that Donaldson was not dangerous to others or himself and was only
receiving custodial care. Ajury awarded Donaldson both compensatory damages and $10,000
in punitive damages against O'Connor. O'Connor appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals and then to the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court remanded the
case to the District Court so that an intervening case on qualified immunity could be
considered.
21 1bid at 407.
22 Lessard, supra, note 17 is noticeable by its absence in O'Connor. In O'Connor, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had held that Donaldson had a right to such individual
treatment as would give him a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental
condition. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 493 F. 2d. 507 (1974). The Supreme Court expressly
declined to decide this issue. The Court transformed this case from a right to treatment case
to a civil commitment case and, only in the latter context, was it prepared to grant relief. For
an interesting account of how the case was almost decided, see B. Schwartz, The Unpublished
Opinions of the Burger Court (New York. Oxford University Press) at 284-323.
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In Addington v. Texas,23 the Supreme Court of the United
States stressed the invasive nature of civil commitment in holding
that the civil standard of proof (a preponderance of the evidence)
was insufficient for commitment cases. The Court instead applied
a standard of "clear and convincing evidence." The Court held that
"the individual should not be asked to share equally with society the
risk of error when the possible injury to the individual is significantly
greater than any possible harm to the state."24 This is referred to
as "heightened scrutiny" and is justified by the seriousness of the
consequences facing the individual.
B. Right to Refuse Treatment
In contrast to the commitment cases, the Supreme Court has
declined to adopt a social control model in the context of forced
treatment.25 While the Supreme Court of the United States has
23 Supra, note 11. For a discussion of Addington, see infra, note 34.
24 ibid. at 331-32.
25 Lower federal courts and state courts have consistently held that a mentally ill person
has a qualified right to refuse treatment. The high water mark of a right to refuse treatment
occurred in two federal cases: Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (1978), 476 F. Supp. 1294
(1979), (expanded to class action) mod, 653 F. 2d 836 (3rd Cir. 1981), (en bane) vacated and
rem'd, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), mod, 720 F. 2d 266 (3rd. Cir. 1983) and Rogers v. Okn, 634
F. 2d 650 (1980). Both these cases found a constitutional right, limited only in emergency
conditions, to refuse psychotropic medication for patients who had not been assessed as
incompetent to make treatment decisions.
State courts have generally held that a patient must be proved incompetent by the
state at a judicial hearing in order to override the right to refuse treatment. See, for example,
Re KKB., 609 P.2d 747 (1980); Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W. 2d 139 (1988); People v. Medina,
705 P.2d 961 (1985); and Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y. 2d 485, 495 N.E. 2d 337, 504 N.Y. Supp. 2d
74 (1986). The more intrusive the treatment, the greater the protection afforded. See
Kaimnowitz v. Deptartnent of Mental Health for the State of Michigan (Circuit Court for Wayne
County, 1973: Civil Action No. 73-19434-AW) (psychosurgery); Knecht v. Gillian, 488 F. 2d
1136 (8th Cir. 1973) (behaviour aversion therapy); and Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781
(M.D. Ala. 1971), hearing on standards, 334 F. Supp. 1341, enf'd, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D.
Ala. 1972), 344 F. Supp. 387, aff'd in part, rem'd in part, res'd in part, sub nom Nyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F. 2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). Also see New York City Health & Hospital Corp.
v. Stein, 335 N.Y. Supp. 2d 461 (1972) (electroconvulsive therapy). Admittedly, treatment is
different than civil commitment. With forced treatment, we are usually dealing with an
individual already detained and thus presumably of less danger to other persons. This should
enable us to focus more on the individual, since he or she is no longer a threat to the public.
756
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held that there is a liberty interest in denying consent for life-saving
medical treatment,26 another recent judgment from that Court has
brought into doubt the existence and scope of the right of
psychiatric patients to refuse treatment.
In Washington v. Harper,27 the issue was whether a prison
inmate, who had been transferred to a special centre for prisoners
with mental illness, could be forcibly treated with neuroleptic drugs
and, if so, what procedures were constitutionally required before
such treatment could be carried out. The particular scheme in
Harper allowed treatment without the patient's consent if he or she
suffered from a mental disorder and was gravely disabled or posed
a likelihood of serious harm to himself or herself or others. A
panel consisting of a psychiatrist, a psychologist, and a hospital
official could, on hearing the evidence, order involuntary treatment
only if the psychiatrist was in the majority of the panel. The
patient/inmate had a right to attend, cross examine witnesses,
present evidence, and be represented by an advisor. The
patient/inmate also had a right to seek review of the panel's decision
in state court.
While the Court was unanimous in holding that there is a
liberty interest in avoiding unwanted administration of neuroleptic
drugs, the majority held that the Constitution did not require any
further procedural protections than were provided in the state
statute.28 The majority held that the extent of the right to refuse
In the commitment context, on the other hand, we may have both the interest of the
individual and of public safety as important factors.
26 In a recent case involving the right to refuse medical treatment, the United States
Supreme Court assumed that a competent person has a constitutionally protected right to
refuse even life-saving treatment. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 111 L
Ed. 2d 224 at 242 (1990) held that "for the purposes of this case, we assume that the United
States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse
life-saving hydration and nutrition' Madam Justice O'Connor made this point more explicitly
in a concurring judgment. Citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 at 105 (1934), the
dissent, penned by Mr. Justice Brennan (Marshall and Blackmun JJ. concurring), agreed at
259: "[Freedom from unwanted medical attention is unquestionably among those principles
so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."
27 108 L. Ed. 2d 178 (1990) [hereinafter Harper].
28 ]bid Mr. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority reasons with Rehnquist, White,
Blackmun, O'Connor, and Scalia JJ. concurring. Mr. Justice Stevens, with Brennan and
1991]
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treatment had to be viewed in the context of the patient/inmate's
confinement. While the majority repeatedly stated that the
medication must be for treatment purposes and "in the inmate's
medical interest,"29 there was also a clear indication in the judgment
that, at least in the prison context, there might be institutional
justifications for forcibly medicating the inmate/prisoner. The Court
first stated that drugs could only be given for treatment purposes,
but then continued:
We hold that, given the requirements of the prison environment, the Due Process
Clause permits the State to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness
with antipsychotic drugs against his will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself or
others and the treatment is in the inmate's medical interest.30
Having held that there are circumstances in which the state
may forcibly medicate a patient/inmate, if treatment is in his or her
medical interest, the next question was what procedural protections
are necessary to ensure that the decision to medicate is "neither
arbitrary nor erroneous."31 Harper argued (and the court below had
agreed) that a full judicial hearing was required with an independent
decision-maker and a right to counsel. While acknowledging the
serious interest any individual would have in avoiding unwanted
administration of drugs and the often serious side-effects and
dangers of neuroleptic medication,32 the Court nonetheless held that
no judicial decision-maker was necessary. The Court suggested that
the patient/inmate might be better served by having a purely medical
decision-maker. The closest the Court came to recognizing the
political nature of a decision to forcibly medicate an individual was
in the following passage:
Marshall JJ. concurring, wrote a strong dissenting opinion.
29 bid. at 202.
3 0 Ibid. at 201-2 (emphasis added).
31 kid. at 202.
32 The majority stated: "1he forcible injection of medication into a nonconsenting
person's body represents a substantial interference with that person's liberty ... While the
therapeutic benefits of antipsychotic drugs are well documented, it is also true that the drugs
can have serious, even fatal, side effects." Ibi. at 203.
758 [voi- 29 No. 4
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Though it cannot be doubted that the decision to medicate has societal and legal
implications, the Constitution does not prohibit the State from permitting medical
personnel to make the decision under fair procedural mechanisms.
"
It is not yet clear whether Harper will be extended without
qualification to the civil psychiatric context, thus denying civilly
committed individuals the right to a judicial hearing before they are
forcibly medicated. One could argue that the institutional concerns
for safety are more pressing in the prison context, since the
individuals involved have committed a criminal offence, and thus that
prisoners have a narrower right to refuse treatment than do
individuals civilly committed. However, in a large civil psychiatric
facility, disciplinary concerns often play a significant role. Whatever
the impact of Harper, the case signals the Court's willingness to
allow a substantial delegation of coercive power from the state to
the psychiatric profession.
C. Discussion
In the previous section, I contrasted the approach of the
United States Supreme Court in commitment and treatment cases in
an attempt to illustrate that the Court has applied a different model
depending upon the nature of the issue.34 Where the issues at
stake are analogous to issues arising in the criminal justice system,
such as the procedures necessary to justify an initial deprivation of
liberty, the Supreme Court seems willing to impose standards on the
33 Ibid. at 204. The Court was very aware that requiring a judicial hearing would cost
money, or in its words at 205, it would "divert scarce prison resources, both money and the
staff's time, from the care and treatment of mentally ill inmates."
34 Of course, there are cases that reflect a combination of both justifications. The
Supreme Court's position on burden of proof in the civil commitment context in Addington,
supra, note 11, for example, reflects the pull to the paternalistic model despite the Court's
efforts to maintain a social control model. While most commentators stress the importance
of the heightened level of scrutiny applied by the Court in this case, one must also recognize
that the Court made a deliberate choice to put a lower standard of justification on the state
than in the criminal process. The Court justified its rejection of the criminal standard by
stressing several aspects of the perceived differences between civil commitment and criminal
punishment. The importance of the criminal model in Addington is clear what the Court
added to the civil standard, it justified on the basis of similarities to criminal law, what the
Court took away from the criminal standard, it justified on the basis of differences to criminal
law.
1991]
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state. In other words, the Court has acknowledged that civil
commitment is an exercise of social control by the state and thus it
has been willing to impose limits by way of the kinds of procedural
protections that are essential to the criminal law process, such as the
right to counsel and notice of hearings.
In contrast to the commitment cases, the Supreme Court has
been particularly deferential when dealing with issues that are
unique to mental health law, such as forced treatment with
psychotropic medication. Just as Gault involved the criminalization
of juvenile justice, Harper involved the medicalization of forced
psychiatric treatment. The rationale seems to be that treatment
decisions involve an exercise of the state's parens patriae power
made for the good of the individual and thus that procedural
protections are not required.
The dissenting judgment in Harper highlights the importance
of separating a paternalistic model and a social control model. The
majority attempted to stress the beneficial aspects of treatment for
the inmate and thus to minimize the procedural protections that
might have been required had it acknowledged that the issue was
essentially an exercise of social control over a prisoner through the
police power. The dissent accused the majority of understating the
liberty interest involved, of misreading the medication policy at issue,
and of misinterpreting the Court's previous decisions dealing with
the rights of prisoners.35 The dissent was also very critical of the
majority's suggestion that institutional factors, such as security and
the protection of property, could be used to justify forced
treatment.3 6
On the liberty interest, Stevens 3. stated:
Every violation of a person's bodily integrity is an invasion of his or her liberty.
The invasion is particularly intrusive if it creates a substantial risk of permanent
injury and premature death. Moreover, any such action is degrading if it overrides
a competent person's choice to reject a specific form of medical treatment. And
when the purpose or effect of forced drugging is to alter the will and the mind of
the subject, it constitutes a deprivation of liberty in the most literal and fundamental
sense.
Supra, note 27 at 208.
36 In the words of the dissent,
[B]y focussing on the risk that the inmate's mental condition poses to other people
and property, the Policy allows the State to exercise either parens patriae authority
or police authority to override a prisoner's liberty interest in refusing psychotropic
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Once it is decided that medication is "for the patient's own
good," the same kinds of procedural safeguards found in the criminal
justice system become less important. For example, the Court in
Harper held that "it is less than crystal clear why lawyers must be
available to identify possible errors in medical judgment."
37
The decision to delegate extensive power to psychiatrists to
make judgments about whom the state can forcibly medicate follows
logically from the paternalistic model. If the state is acting
benevolently to cure the sick, who better to make decisions about
the sick than the medical profession. The majority in Harper
displayed great deference to psychiatric expertise. The starting point
was that psychiatric judgments on medication reflect the "truth" in
terms of the patient's best interest. This shifts the issue to when we
will allow the patient/inmate to depart from his or her own interests,
rather than when we will let the patient/inmate make his or her own
decisions about what those interests are. The majority assumed that
psychiatrists know when to order medication, would never do so
contrary to the interests of the patient, and are rarely wrong.
38
Individuals confined in psychiatric facilities in the United
States have had the most success in court when they have been able
to frame their cases in a liberal rights oriented paradigm, focusing
on the invasiveness of coercive state involvement in mental health
decisions and on the similarities to criminal law. This has been most
successful in the commitment context. In issues unique to
psychiatry, like forced treatment, there is a greater reliance on the
parens patriae justifications for commitment and a corresponding
delegation to psychiatrists of the authority to forcibly medicate
individuals apparently suffering from a mental illness.
Keeping these developments in mind, I will now turn to
consider the Canadian experience and the emerging jurisprudence
drugs. Thus, most unfortunately, there is simply no basis for the Court's assertion
that medication under the Policy must be to advance the prisoner's medical interest.
Ibid. at 213.
3 7 Ibid. at 207, citing Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305
at 330, 87 L Ed. 2d 220 (1985) (emphasis in original).
38 Kennedy . stated: "Unlike the dissent, we will not assume that physicians will
prescribe these drugs for reasons unrelated to the medical needs of the patients; indeed the
ethics of the medical profession are to the contrary." bid. at 199 n. 2.
1991]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Early Charter
decisions from our Supreme Court indicate that, at least in criminal
law, we may be going through a period of concern about individual
rights and enhanced protections for accused persons analogous to
that of the United States in the 1960s.39 The American experience
might lead one to expect that this development would spill over into
the mental health law context, with the courts paying more attention
to the rights of persons with mental disabilities. As we shall see, no
such trend has yet emerged.
IV. CANADIAN EXPERIENCE
The scope of judicial involvement in mental health law has
changed since the Charter came into force. Prior to 1982, most
cases arose out of judicial review of. either the commitment decision
or of an administrative tribunal's review of the detention. The
substance of a provincial statutory scheme for involuntary com-
mitment and treatment was largely immune from judicial scrutiny.
Since the proclamation of the Charter, however, the courts have had
the jurisdiction to review the substance of provincial legislation
regarding mental health as well as the behaviour of officials and
professionals providing mental health services. Despite the early
optimism that a constitutional bill of rights would be a powerful tool
with which to fight for legal reforms,40 individuals with mental
disabilities have not made much progress using the Charter.
While there have not been a large number of Charter cases
dealing with persons with mental disabilities,41 a review of the case
39 See, for example, R v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613; Collins v. ., [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265;
R v. Vaillancourt, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636; R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151; R v. Mardneau,
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 633; and R v. Hess; R v. Nggen, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 906.
40 See, for example, D. Vickers & 0. Endicott, 'Mental Disability and Equality Rights"
in A.F. Bayefsky & M. Eberts, eds, Equality Rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) 381.
41 Robert Gordon and Simon Verdun-Jones suggest that the dearth of scholarship and
jurisprudence in this area may reflect "the absence of a tradition of an adequately funded and
aggressive system of delivering advocacy services on behalf of mental health patients in Canada
as a whole." See "The Trials of Mental Health Law- Recent Trends and Developments in
Canadian Mental Health Jurisprudence" (1988) 11 Dal. L.J. 833 at 847. Another difficulty
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law reveals that Canadian courts are heavily reliant on the
paternalistic model for state involvement in mental health decisions.
The state is seen quite literally as a parent, protecting those who
cannot protect themselves and making decisions for those who the
state believes cannot make decisions for themselves. One can also
detect great deference towards psychiatric expertise. While courts
have taken for granted their own competence to make decisions on
the rights of other disadvantaged groups,42 they have repeatedly
deferred to alleged psychiatric expertise in cases dealing with persons
with a mental disability.
In the following section of this paper, I will examine recent
judicial developments in Canadian mental health law in the areas
of civil commitment and treatment. The fact that so few cases have
reached the appellate level in Canada is an indication of the low
priority given to such issues and of the difficulties associated with
seeking judicial remedies.43 Nonetheless, one can still learn about
judicial attitudes towards psychiatry by looking at the few appellate
and lower court decisions that are available.
in developing a litigation strategy in mental health law relates to the problem of mootness.
There appears to be a practice in some provinces of releasing patients who are plaintiffs in
Charter challenges so that the case becomes moot and the litigation is abandoned. This is
in addition to patients being released in good faith before the challenge progresses to the
courts and especially to the appellate level. Given the likelihood of readmission to a
psychiatric facility for many of these individuals, an exception to the mootness bar should be
developed.
42 For example, the Supreme Court of Canada has handed down several decisions dealing
with the rights of women. See, for example, R v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30; Brooks v.
Canada Safeway Ltd, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219; and Tremblay v. Daigle, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 530.
43 In fact, there are no cases on civil commitment and the Charter that have made it to
the Supreme Court of Canada. The only cases heard by the Supreme Court are R v. Swain,
[1991] 1 S.C.R. 933, 63 C.C.C. (3d) 481, rev'g. (1986) 24 C.C.C. (3d) 385, 53 O.R. (2d) 609
(CA.) [hereinafter Swain cited to C.C.C.], an Ontario case dealing with the insanity defence
and the constitutionality of the Lieutenant Governor's warrant process, and R v. Chaulk and
Morrissette, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303, 119 N.R. 161 [hereinafter Chaulk and Monissette] dealing
with the constitutionality of the presumption of sanity. See also infra, note 74. It is notable
that cases dealing with mental illness in the criminal context are much more likely to reach
the appellate courts than civil commitment or forced treatment cases. See R v. Godfrey
(1984), 11 C.C.C. (3d) 233 (Man. CA.); Swain; Chaulk and Morrissette; and Rebic v. Collver
Prov. J and AG. British Columbia (1986), 2 B.C.L.R. (2d) 364 (B.C.CA) [hereinafter Rebic].
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While most of the early Charter challenges were procedural
in nature and brought under sections 7, 9, and 10 of the Charter,44
section 15 is increasingly being used as the basis of Charter
challenges.45 Section 15 has been addressed in six non-criminal
cases in the mental health law context.46 In only one of the cases
was the section 15 argument successful.
47
A. Commitment Procedures
In Canada, unlike the United States, the decision to civilly
commit an individual is usually made by physicians and not by courts.
Most provinces provide for review of this decision, usually by an
administrative tribunal (a review board or panel). Most provincial
statutes provide for judicial review of detention and/or of the review
panel's decision regarding detention.
44
Section 7 provides: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person
and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice." Section 9 provides: "Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily
detained or imprisoned." Section 10 provides: "Everyone has the right, on arrest or detention
(a) to be informed promptly of the reasons therefor, (b) to retain and instruct counsel without
delay and to be informed of that right; and (c) the right to have the validity of the detention
determined by way of habeas corpus and to be released if the detention is not lawful."
45 Section 15(1) provides: "Every individual is equal before and under the law and has
the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in
particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex,
age or mental or physical disability." Section 15(2) provides: "Subsection (1) does not
preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of
disadvantaged individuals or groups including those t4.at are disadvantaged because of race,
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability."
46 Section 15 has been raised in Swain, supra, note 43 and in Rebic, supra, note 43. In
Swain, the Supreme Court of Canada limited the Crown's right to raise insanity and
invalidated the automatic confinement resulting from an insanity acquittal. Rebic also involved
a challenge to the insanity defence in section 16 of the Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985,
c. C-46 [hereinafter Criminal Code]. The six non-criminal cases raising mental disability under
section 15 are Reference Re Procedures and the Mental Health Act (1984), 5 D.L.R. (4th) 577
(P.E.I. S.C.) [hereinafter Re Mental Health Act]; Firh v. Sault Ste. Marie (1988), 7 A.C.W.S.
(3d) 377 (Ont. Dist. Ct); Dayday v. MacEwan (1987), 62 O.R. (2d) 588 (Ont. Dist. Ct)
[hereinafter Dayday]; Re Howlett v. Karunaratne (1988), 64 O.R. (2d) 418 (Ont. Dist. Ct); Nova
Scotia (Minister of Community Services) v. Carter (1988), 89 N.S.R. (2d) 275 (Fain. Ct); and
Fenton v. Forensic Psychiatric Services Association (7 December 1989), C 85 4338 (B.C.S.C.),
rev'd. (31 May 1991), V 01130 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter Fenton].
4 7 Fenton, ibid.
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1. Admission procedures
Only two challenges to commitment procedures have been
successful and, in each case, the surrounding circumstances mitigated
the importance of the remedy granted. In Lussa v. Health Science
Centre,48 Ms. Lussa sought review of her involuntary detention.
Kroft J. held that, although the plaintiff probably had a mental
disorder and had illustrated irrational and difficult behaviour, there
was no evidence that she presented a danger or a risk of harm to
others or to herself. Further, prior to her court action, she had not
had a meaningful opportunity to challenge her detention. The
Court held that, if Ms. Lussa's detention were to continue, her
constitutional right not to be arbitrarily detained (section 9 of the
Charter) would have been violated.49
The only other successful challenge to commitment
procedures occurred in Thwaites v. Health Sciences Centre Psychiatric
Facility.50 The Manitoba Mental Health Act,SZ at issue in Thwaites,
contained very broad committal criteria. Section 9(1) provided for
commitment where the physician believed "that the person should be
confined as a patient at a psychiatric facility." The plaintiffs
argument was that the criteria for detention under the Act were not
sufficiently specified. The Court phrased the crucial question as
follows: "Does the legislation that authorizes detention sufficiently
define the persons who may be subject to the legislation and the
circumstances under which they may be compulsorily detained?"5 2
The Court answered this question in the negative and
concluded' that the compulsory admission provisions in the Act were
arbitrary and in violation of section 9 of the Charter. In addressing
48 (1983), 9 C.R.R. 350 (Man. Q.B.) [hereinafter Lussa].
49 Kroft J. also found that Ms. Lussa's right to counsel had been denied. While noting
that there may have been a sign posted on the hospital wall informing her of this right, he
stressed that the hospital had an obligation to ensure either that patients understood their
rights or that they were incapable of so understanding.
50 [1988] 3 W.W.R. 217 (Man. CA) [hereinafter Thwaites].
51 R.S.M. 1987, c. M-110.
52 Thwaites, supra, note 50 at 224.
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section 1 of the Charter, the Court assumed, without any evidence,
that providing compulsory treatment and hospitalization for a person
with a mental disability is a compelling objective which could
override constitutionally protected fights. However, the Court held
that, because the procedures lacked any clear objective standards,
they were not rationally connected to the governmental objective.
Despite the apparent success for the plaintiffs in Lussa and
Thwaites, both Courts seemed to be fearful of granting remedies
that would have the potential to release large numbers of persons
from psychiatric facilities and fearful of what such persons would
do on release. In Lussa, the Court was comfortable in releasing
Ms. Lussa, but refused to say anything about the constitutionality
of the Act which might be relevant to other persons involuntarily
detained. The judgment was deliberately worded narrowly so as to
have an effect on the detention of Ms. Lussa only.53 Kroft J.
stressed that he was not striking down any part of the Act and that,
if a "serious concern" continued to exist about Ms. Lussa, the
hospital could reinstitute commitment proceedings.
In Thwaites, the only successful appellate level challenge to
commitment procedures, the peculiar political circumstances
mitigated the importance of the remedy granted. At the time of
Thwaites, amendments to the Manitoba Mental Health Act had been
passed by the provincial government but not proclaimed. Thwaites
was thus used to pressure the government to proclaim the new
provisions. It was safe for the Court to invalidate the legislation
because it knew the legislature was prepared to step in with new
legislative provisions:
In this case, declaring the compulsory admission provisions of the Act of no force
or effect need not result in grave or far-reaching consequences. We are not told
why the Lieutenant Governor in Council has not proclaimed into force the
amendments to the Act passed at the last session of the Manitoba legislature to
which I have referred above. Those amendments can be proclaimed into force at
Although other patients might have been able to assert a denial of the right to
counsel.
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an early date. They will ensure that those persons suffering from a mental disorder
and likely to cause serious harm to themselves or others or to suffer substantial
mental or physical deterioration will have available to them the treatment they
require, even as involuntary patients.
5 4
An examination of some of the commitment cases where
Charter arguments have failed is also instructive about judicial
attitudes towards persons with mental disabilities. In Re Mental
Health Act,55 for example, the Prince Edward Island Supreme Court
in banco considered the constitutionality of the Prince Edward Island
Mental Health Act.5 6 In rejecting an argument that the Act
discriminated against persons with mental disabilities, the Court
adopted a very paternalistic attitude, suggesting that the state
imposes forced confinement and treatment to protect, not only the
safety of the individual, but also his or her dignity. McQuaid J.'s
interpretation of the historical view of persons with mental
disabilities is revealing: "Historically, the law in the English tradition
has had a special care and regard for all subjects who suffered from
mental disturbance. Although one might question some of the
earlier methods countenanced by the law of an earlier day, none the
less, the intent was benign."57  The Court described the purpose of
the Act as follows:
The thrust of the Mental Health Act, including its predecessors, has been the safety,
support and succor of those who suffer from, or appear to suffer from, a
debilitating mental disability or disorder and who, as a consequence, require
hospitalization whether voluntary or otherwise, for their own safety or the safety of
others. In this context the word "safety" goes beyond mere protection from the
54 Supra, note 50 at 231. Shortly after Thwaites and after the proclamation of the new
legislation, the constitutionality of Manitoba's Mental Health Act, supra, note 51 was before
the Court of Queen's Bench. In Bobbie v. Health Sciences Centre, [1989] 2 W.W.R. 153, Scott
A.CJ.Q.B. held that the new Act met the concerns expressed in Thwaites by including within
it "objective criteria" for involuntary detention. The newAct adopted a "dangerousness" test
for admission and included within it revised definitions of "mental disorder" and "mental
retardation."
55 Supra, note 46.
56 R.S.P.E.I. 1974, c. M-9.
57 Re Mental Health Act, supra, note 46 at 589. This reflects a commonly held view that,
while psychiatry may have been lacking in expertise and understanding of mental illness in the
past and while some of its treatments may have been inhumane, we have now reached a state
where psychiatry is so scientific and its methods so well developed that comparisons to an
earlier era are inappropriate.
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infliction of physical injury but includes such things as the alleviation of distressing
physical, mental or psychiatric symptoms as well as the provision of creature
comfort in appropriately congenial physical surroundings. 5 8
The conclusion on section 15 was terse: "If this be discrimination,
as contemplated by section 15(1) of the Charter, based on mental
disability, then so be it."59 The Court went on to hold that even if
the Act violated section 15 (a possibility that never received serious
attention), it could be upheld as a reasonable limit under section 1
of the Charter.
The Court's view seems to be that "special" treatment
(justified under a paternalistic rationale) could never violate rights.
The Court also generalized about the competence of individuals
psychiatrically detained and the usefulness of legal mechanisms to
assert patient rights. It even went so far as to set out a de facto
presumption of incompetence for individuals seeking judicial relief:
As a class (although there may well be individual exceptions within that class),
persons who suffer from a mental disorder of such a nature or degree as to require
hospitalization for their own safety or the safety of others, are, in general, not
competent to instruct counsel, nor would counsel accept and act upon instructions
of one who was, at the time, suffering from such a disability.
6 0
While the P.E.I. Court acknowledged the uncertainties and
fallibility of psychiatry, it concluded by advising the greatest of
caution in disagreeing with a psychiatric judgment:
ITmhe law, as I perceive it to be, leans in favour of the care and treatment of those
who do so suffer, even by involuntary detention if need be, when that illness has
been demonstrably diagnosed by those practitioners skilled in the discipline, and
only for the gravest reasons should the cour or a boar4 an inquhy or review,
substitute its lay opinion for the professional opinion, 61
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid. at 590.
61 Ibid. at 591 (emphasis added). Mr. Jenkins, whose action for habeas corpus triggered
Re Mental Health Act, was back before McQuaid I. in Re Jenkins (1986), 178 A.P.R. 62 (P.E.I.
S.C.), arguing that the earlier case had been implicitly overruled by Reference Re Section 94(2)
of the Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486. Mr. Jenkins was representing himself and the
Court did not bother to spell out the nature of his argument. Given that the Charter issue
in Re Mental Health Act revolved around section 15, it is difficult to speculate on the nature
of Mr. Jenkins's argument. In any event, McQuaid J. held that the Act did not violate
sections 7 or 9 of the Charter.
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This view seems to suggest that the Court is willing to have
professionals decide the very issues before it. If this view is
followed, the psychiatrist takes on the role of the trier of fact and
judicial responsibility is minimized.
2. Review of detention
Most provincial mental health statutes in Canada provide for
some form of administrative review during the first month of
commitment.6 2 For most committed individuals, this review may be
62 In Alberta, a hearing must be held by the review panel as soon as is possible or within
21 days of the receipt of the application by the chairman. See Mental Health Act, S. 1988,
c. M-13.1, s. 40(4).
In British Columbia, a patient is entitled to a review panel within one month of his
or her involuntary detention. The task of the review panel is to decide whether that individual
should be detained or released. See Mental Health Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 256, s. 21(4), as am.
S.B.C. 1987, c. 42, s. 72(a).
In Ontario, a patient is entitled to a review hearing within seven days after the day
that the review board receives notice requiring a hearing. See Mental Health Act, R.S.O.
1980, c. 262, s. 33(b)(2).
In Manitoba, the patient's status must be reviewed "promptly" upon the receipt of
an application for review. See The Mental Health Act, supra, note 51, s. 26.2.
The New Brunswick Mental Health Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. M-10, as am. S.N.B. 1985,
c. 59, ss 29, 31 includes a provision which allows any involuntary patient to apply to a review
board for a review of his or her detention when any certificate of detention comes into force.
The board must conduct an inquiry within five days of receiving such an application and may
hold a hearing for the purpose of receiving oral testimony.
In Newfoundland, The Mental Health Act, S.N. 1971, No. 80 provides for review of
an involuntary patient's detention upon the receipt of an application for review by the board.
Section 17 provides that any person "aggrieved and affected by the detention of a patient" may
make such an application. There seems to be no specified time within which the review must
be held, although section 18(1) permits the review board to summarily dismiss an application
in certain circumstances.
In the Northwest Territories, an involuntary patient, or someone on his or her
behalf, may make an application to the Supreme Court for a review of the patient's detention.
Such review and the decision of the judge must be made within 14 days of the application for
review. See Mental Health Act, S.N.W.T. 1985 (2d Sess.), c. 6, ss 27(1), 29(2).
In Nova Scotia, a review board must review the file of a patient within one month
of receiving a request for review. See the Hospitals Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 208, s. 65(1).
The Prince Edward Island Mental Health Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. M-6, ss 25-26
permits an involuntary patient, or another person on his or her behalf, to apply to a review
board for a review of his or her detention. Within 14 days of the receipt of such application
by the chairman of the review board, the board must conduct an inquiry as to the validity of
the detention and may hold a hearing to hear testimony in that regard.
In Quebec, a close treatment patient, or specified others on his or her behalf, may
apply to the Commission des affaires sociales for a review of the detention. See Mental
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the only meaningful opportunity to challenge the detention. Thus,
this process raises many important questions about how best to
protect the interests of the person who has been detained. Review
panels or boards make important decisions about the liberty of the
individual before them. In some provinces, the procedures and rules
of evidence for a review panel are left almost entirely to the
discretion of the chair of the panel. 63 This is justified by the alleged
need for flexibility in order to deal with the vast array of fact
situations that come before the panel.64
One important question in the review context is what
evidence should be considered by the review board or panel.
Review boards almost always rely heavily on hearsay evidence:
medical reports, nursing reports, notes from social workers, and
statements from people the social worker may have interviewed.
Allegations of past violence or police contact, even if not
substantiated, often form part of the record. Given the dynamics of
the review process, once this evidence is seen, it is almost impossible
Patients Protection Act, R.S.Q. 1974, c. P-41, s. 30.
In Saskatchewan, upon receipt of an involuntary patient's notice of appeal, the
review panel shall "immediately carry out any investigation that it considers necessary to
speedily determine the validity of the appeal," and it shall then invite the persons affected by
the appeal to testify or present evidence relating to the appeal. See The Mental Health
Services Act, S.S. 1984-85-86, c. M-13.1, s. 34(6).
The Yukon Mental Health Act, R.S.Y.T. 1986, c. 115, ss 8(2), 9 provides for the
review of an involuntary patient's detention by the Mental Health Review Board "as soon as
is practical after the committal."
63 In British Columbia, for example, there is no statutory guidance on the standard of
review the panel is to apply. There are informal meetings of the members of the panel, the
patient, and occasionally the patient's counsel. While a detained individual has a statutory
right to counsel, the Legal Services Society does not provide funding for patients to have
counsel before the review panel. Instead, a patient advocate office, staffed with two lawyers,
is supposed to provide legal services for all psychiatric patients in the lower mainland.
64 There have been a number of cases dealing with the procedures of the various review
boards set up under the Crininal Code, supra, note 46 for the review of patients on
Lieutenant Governor's Warrants (LGW). Although this review process is entirely separate
from the function of a civil review panel, some of the fairness issues in the LGW cases are
relevant to the standards of fairness a review panel must provide, since both bodies are
making decisions about the liberty of the individual. See, for example, Re Abel and Advisory
Review Board (1980), 56 C.C.C. (2d) 153 (Ont. C.A.); Re McCann and the Queen (1982), 136
D.LR. (3d) 629 (B.C.C.A.); Re Egglestone and Mousseau and Advisory Review Board (1983),
42 O.R. (2d) 268 (Div. Ct.); Re Jollinore and the Queen (1986), 27 C.C.C. (3d) 166 (N.S.
S.C. T.D.); and A.G. Ontario v. Grady (1988), 34 C.R.R. 289 (Ont. H.C.).
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for the patient to negate it effectively. By its very presence in the
medical chart, the evidence takes on an air of credibility that few
patients are able to rebut. Attempts to deny information in the
record are often characterized as further proof of mental illness.
In Dayday v. MacEwan,65 Ms. Dayday challenged the
constitutionality of the admission of hearsay evidence before the
review board in its hearing to review her involuntary detention. Her
section 15 Charter argument was that detaining a person based on
hearsay evidence constitutes discrimination on the basis of mental
disability. Since the state does not detain non-mentally disabled
persons on the basis of hearsay evidence, it should not detain
mentally disabled persons on this basis.
While the Court was somewhat troubled by the use of
hearsay evidence, it allowed its admission relying on a very
paternalistic view of the review process. Hence, Ms. Dayday's
section 15 challenge failed:
Although one might have serious reservations about the wisdom of allowing hearsay
evidence to be used in such cases, the ultimate decision to do so must be left to
the legislature so long as it legislates within the confines of the Charter ... In my
view, mentally disordered persons fall into a special class of persons who require
special legislative treatment for their own protection and that of socieg To give them
such special treatment does not violate section 15 of the Charter. 6
The Court did find for Ms. Dayday on narrower grounds.
Her certificate of renewal was rescinded because the same
psychiatrist sat on both review boards.67 While Ms. Dayday lost her
Charter challenge to the admission of hearsay evidence on the basis
of the "specialness" of mental disability, she won her case on the
issue of bias, a familiar doctrine in administrative law. This suggests
that, when dealing with the "specialness" of mental illness, the Court
was unwilling to draw analogies to other areas of law and reduced
procedural protections were justified. When the Court was able to
draw an analogy to another area of law, where fairness (and the
perception thereof) to the individual is a guiding principle, it was
65 Supra, note 46.
66 Ibid. at 596-97 (emphasis added).
67 This was prohibited by statute.
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able to grant the plaintiff relief. As with Lussa68 and Thwaites,69
the Court was concerned about limiting the scope of the relief to
the party before it.70
3. Burden of proof
Another important issue which arises at commitment and
review of commitment is the issue of burden of proof: who must
prove, and on what standard, whether an individual should be
committed or released. Decisions about burden of proof are
decisions about certainty and risk allocation. The question of
certainty focuses on whether some kinds of judgments, such as
psychiatric evaluations, can ever be "proven" on a sufficiently
stringent legal standard. This is related to the risk allocation
function. If there is some chance that the decision in issue could be
mistaken, the burden of proof determines who should bear the risk
of such a mistake. Normally, the risk of mistake is allocated to the
party who would suffer the least negative consequences from that
mistake.
The burden of proof to justify commitment has been
addressed in several Canadian cases, usually as a question of
statutory interpretation rather than of constitutional requirement.71
Most Canadian courts have taken the view that, when an involuntary
Supra, note 48.
69 Supra, note 50.
70 The Court in Dayday, supra, note 46 at 600 recognized that the role of civil
commitment was limited and that nuisance to families, neighbours, and possibly even the
individual himself or herself is not a sufficient cause for detention. Matlow J. stated:
There are, unfortunately, many people in our community who suffer from mental
disorders of a nature or quality that likely will result in minor assaults and nuisances
to other persons. I am persuaded that the applicant satisfies this general
description. The Mental Health Act, however, does not authorize their detention
even though their being free may occasionally result in injury to others.
71 See, for example, Re Robinson and Hislop (1980), 114 D.L.R. (3d) 621 (B.C.S.C.)
[hereinafter Robinson]; Re Mental Health Act, supra, note 46; and Re Azhar and Anderson (25
June 1985), (Ont. Dist. Ct) [unreported]. In Robinson, a pre-Charter decision, Locke J. of the
B.C. Supreme Court held that, in a judicial review of a civil commitment, the patient must
show there is aprimafacie case for release and the burden then shifts to the hospital to show,
on a balance of probabilities, that the commitment and continued detention were justified.
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commitment is being challenged in court, the hospital must justify
the detention on a simple civil standard: a balance of
probabilities.72 The courts have consistently rejected the more
stringent criminal burden of proof and even the heightened civil
standard of proof that the American Supreme Court has said is
constitutionally required.73
In contrast to criminal law, Canadian courts have not given
much consideration to the constitutional aspects of burden of proof
in the mental health law context.74 For example, in Re Azhar and
Anderson,75 Judge Locke described the issue as follows:
In my respectful view, the required standard of proof while important is not pivotal
in the process of protecting and balancing the rights of individuals as against the
responsibility that the state owes to society in general in the field of mental health.
If the standard is made too onerous, it seems obvious that society may become
endangered by the failure of sincere physicians to adequately detain and treat
dangerous or potentially dangerous people who unfortunately suffer from mental
disorders.
76
Locke J. minimized the role of the criminal standard of proof in
allocating the risk of mistaken deprivations of liberty to the state:
On the other hand, even with the imposition of the high criminal standard of proof
being beyond a reasonable doubt, individuals in society will not always necessarily
automatically be protected from the abuse of improper committals. The standard
72 The Supreme Court of Canada recently held that the presumption of sanity in section
16(4) of the Criminal Code, which puts the burden of proof on the accused when alleging
insanity, is a reasonable limit on the presumption of innocence. See Chaulk and Morrissette,
supra, note 43. The majority decision of Lamer CJ.C. in Chaulk and Morrissette marked the
first major retreat from the stringent section 1 Oakes test in the criminal law context. It is
significant that Lamer C.J.C. would make his first retreat from Oakes, in the criminal law
context in a case involving mental illness. See infra, note 74.
73 See Addington, supra, note 11.
74 Contrast this with the number of Supreme Court of Canada cases on the Charter
implications for burden of proof in the criminal context. See, for example, 1 v. Oakes, [1986]
1 S.C.R. 103; R v. Holmes, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 914; R. v. Whyte, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 3; and R v.
Schwartz, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 443. The first Supreme Court of Canada Charter decision dealing
with mental illness also arose in the criminal law context. See Chaulk and Morrissette, supra,
note 43.
75 Supra, note 71.
76 Aid. at 13.
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of proof is but one important factor among several that should achieve the desirable
balance.
77
The Court failed even to acknowledge that the potential danger to
the public from persons who commit criminal offenses has not led
us to adopt a lower standard of proof in criminal law. The potential
presence of mental illness, as opposed to just criminality, is used to
justify reduced concern about the mistakes made by the system.
78
Nor does the Court consider the other issue involved in burden of
proof, namely, that of certainty. The empirical evidence suggests
that psychiatrists are not very good predictors of who will be
dangerous to themselves or to others.79 Nonetheless, civil commit-
ment is often based on such predictions.
B. Right to Refuse Treatment
The common law recognizes a competent person's right to
refuse medical treatment. In a recent decision, the Ontario Court
of Appeal held that an individual has a common law right to refuse
even life sustaining treatment and that the right is not premised on
77 Ibid.
78 In contrast to civil commitment are the dangerous offender provisions, sections 752-
761 of the Criminal Code, supra, note 46. A judge must decide whether an accused person
should be subjected to indeterminate incarceration as a dangerous offender. Canadian courts
have consistently required that the Crown prove the likelihood of dangerousness beyond a
reasonable doubt. Admittedly, I have elsewhere challenged whether the reasonable doubt
standard can have any meaning in the predictive context because all the empirical evidence
suggests psychiatrists do not have the ability to predict dangerousness with sufficient precision.
See I. Grant, "Dangerous Offenders" (1985) 9 Dal. L.J. 347 at 360-61. See also R v. Lyons,
[1987] 2 S.C.R. 309, where La Forest J. holds that indeterminate detention in the criminal
context, based on past crimes and predictions of future dangerousness, does not violate the
Charter. Nonetheless, the burden of proof also serves a symbolic function. In criminal law,
the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is a recognition of the gravity of the consequences
facing an accused person. The lack of attention given to this issue in mental health law
reflects a failure to acknowledge the gravity of the consequences of mistaken or unnecessary
commitments.
79 See Cocozza & Steadman, supra, note 4, where the authors describe the literature on
the dangerousness of psychiatric patients. See also Mesnikoff & Lauterbach, supra, note 4 and
Diamond, supra, note 4.
1991] Mental Health Law
understanding the risks of refusal8 ° The Court explained the right
to refuse treatment as follows:
The right of self-determination which underlies the doctrine of informed consent
also obviously encompasses the right to refuse medical treatment. A competent
adult is generally entitled to reject a specific treatment or all treatment, or to select
an alternate form of treatment, even if the decision may entail risks as serious as
death and may appear mistaken in the eyes of the medical profession or of the
community. Regardless of the doctor's opinion, it is the patient who has the final
say on whether to undergo the treatment ... [P]eople must have the right to make
choices that accord with their own values regardless of how unwise or foolish these
choices may appear to others.8 1
Since the common law is clear that all competent individuals have
a right to refuse medical treatment, one would expect that
competent psychiatric patients would have the right to refuse
treatment "however unwise or foolish these choices may appear to
others."82  However, legislatures and courts have treated civilly
committed persons differently than other hospitalized patients.
Several provinces have legislatively overridden the common law and
provided for forced treatment of competent civilly committed
persons8 3  In addition, virtually every province has statutory
8 0 Malette v. Shubnan (1990), 67 D.LR. (4th) 321 (Ont. CA) [hereinafter Malette]. In
Malette, the plaintiff was brought to the hospital unconscious after a car accident. A card was
discovered in her purse indicating that, on the basis of her religion, she did not consent to
the administration of blood products. Dr. Shulman, believing her life to be at risk, gave her
blood transfusions nonetheless. Ms. Malette successfully sued the doctor and received
damages of $20,000.
81 Ibid. at 328. It is important to note that, in Malette, the plaintiff was clearly
incompetent to make a decision about the proposed treatment at the time it was to be
administered; she was unconscious. Nonetheless, the Court looked at the wishes of the
plaintiff at an earlier time when she was competent to make the decision. Thus, the situation
was analogous to the case of a person in a psychiatric facility who, while presently
incompetent, has previously expressed his or her wishes not to receive treatment.
82 Ibid.
83 Competent patients can be treated without their consent in Alberta, British Columbia,
Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, the Northwest Territories, and the Yukon. See the
Alberta Mental Health Act, supra, note 62, s. 29; British Columbia Mental Health Act, supra,
note 62, as am. S.B.C. 1981, c. 21, s. 47; Manitoba, The Mental Health Act, supra, note 51, s.
25; New Brunswick Mental Health Act, supra, note 62, s. 13.1; Newfoundland The Mental
Health Act, supra, note 62, s. 6(1); Northwest Territories Mental Health Act, supra, note 62,
s. 22; and Yukon Territories Mental Health Act, supra, note 62, s. 7.
In Quebec, patients who have been found unfit to manage their affairs can also be
subject to involuntary treatment. See Public Curatorship Act, R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-80, s. 8. The
Prince Edward Island Mental Health Act, supra, note 62 makes no reference to treatment
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provisions providing for the forced treatment of incompetent persons
detained in a psychiatric facility.
84
Prior to the Charter, challenges to legislated compulsory
treatment were limited in scope to questions of statutory
interpretation and fair procedures. For example, in Re T and Board
of Review for the Western Region,85 the hospital involved was seeking
authorization of electroconvulsive therapy (Ecr) for a patient who
had denied her consent and for whom family members had denied
substitute consent. Under the legislation existing at the time, the
board of review could compel the patient to have the treatment as
long as it was not "psychosurgery." Thus, the whole case focussed
on whether ECT was a form of psychosurgery. The question of how
the state could possibly justify imposing Ecr on a patient, when both
the patient and her family objected, was not considered.8 6
decisions and thus presumably the common law applies. In Saskatchewan, only patients who
are incompetent to make treatment decisions are subject to committal and therefore, once a
patient is admitted involuntarily, that patient may be forced to undergo any treatment which
the physician considers necessary to treat the mental disorder, with the exception of
psychosurgery and experimental treatment. See The Mental Health Services Act, supra, note
62, ss 24(2) and 25(2).
Nova Scotia and Ontario are the only provinces with a clear right to refuse
treatment for competent patients. See the Nova Scotia Hospitals Act, supra, note 62, ss 51,
54 and 56 and the Ontario Mental Health Act, supra, note 62, s. 35(2)(a). Some provinces
distinguish the types of treatment that can be authorized without consent. In Alberta, for
example, treatment refusal can be overridden for competent and incompetent patients,
although psychosurgery cannot be performed without consent. See Mental Health Act, supra,
note 62, s. 29. In the Northwest Territories, a competent patient may be treated, notwith-
standing his or her refusal to consent to treatment, if the patient's nearest relative consents
to the treatment. Psychosurgery may not be performed on a patient unless that patient is
competent and consents to the procedure, and ECT may not be performed on a patient
unless the patient is competent and consents, or in the case of an incompetent patient, the
patient's nearest relative gives consent to the treatment. See Mental Health Act, supra, note
62, ss 22 and 23.
84 The Prince Edward Island statute does not provide for compulsory treatment, but the
common law would probably allow for involuntary treatment of incompetent patients. Some
provinces employ a system of substitute decision-makers for incompetent persons. In Ontario,
for example, the legislation lists, in order of priority, persons who might make substituted
decisions for the incompetent person. Substitute decision-makers may decide the treatment
question on the basis of what the incompetent individual wanted at a time when he or she was
competent or by some formulation of a best interests test.
85 0983) 3 D.L.R. (4th) 442 (Ont. H.C.).
86 The Court held that ECT was not a form of psychosurgery and thus that the board
could authorize the procedure without consent.
1991] Mental Health Law
The Charter has provided a mechanism to challenge both the
procedural requirements of overriding a patient's refusal and the
substance of the override itself. To-date, however, such challenges
lhave met with little success.8 7 In Re Howlett v. Karunaratne,88 for
example, the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of compulsory
treatment for a person found to be incompetent. She alleged that
forcible treatment constituted a violation of her security of the
person under section 7 and that the violation was not in accordance
with the principles of fundamental justice. McDermid D.C.J.
concluded that any deprivation of security of the person was in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice:
[I]t is generally accepted as a fundamental principle of our society that the state has
an obligation to care for disabled persons who are through no fault of their own,
unable to care for themselves. While there is debate as to the type of care that
should be provided and the persons to whom it should be extended, the principle
itself is generally accepted .8
McDermid D.C.J. held that the distinction made by the
Ontario Mental Health Act was not a distinction between persons
suffering from a mental disability and persons not so suffering, but
rather between persons who are competent to make decisions
regarding treatment and those who are not. He indicated that since
87 For a summary of the developments in Canadian jurisprudence in this area, see S.N.
Verdun-Jones, "The Right to Refuse Treatment: Recent Developments in Canadian
Jurisprudence" (1988) 11 Int'l J. L & Psych. 51. Most of the challenges to forced treatment
have taken place in Ontario and have involved individuals found to be incompetent. The
recent challenge to the British Columbia legislation, which permits compulsory treatment of
competent patients, may have a better chance of success. In British Columbia, an involuntary
patient can be treated without consent by the authorization of the director of the facility.
There is no statutory requirement that the patient be found incompetent before such
authorization takes place. Rather, treatment authorized by the director of the facility is
deemed to be given with the patient's consent. The first Charter challenge to the forced
treatment of competent patients was initiated in Philhip Clapci v. AG. British Columbia
(Supreme Court of British Columbia, statement of claim filed 3 May 1990, Vancouver
Registry). As in many cases involving psychiatrically detained individuals, Mr. Clapci has been
in and out of the hospital since the writ was filed and it is unclear whether the case will
proceed.
88 Supra, note 46.
89 Ibid. at 430.
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mentally competent persons are not similarly situated to mentally
incompetent persons, there was no section 15 violation?0
In another unsuccessful Charter challenge to the forced
treatment provisions for incompetent persons in Ontario's Mental
Health Act, Tobias D.C.J. rejected the argument that the provisions
violated section 7 or section 15 of the Charter.91 In so doing, he
relied entirely on a paternalistic model of forced treatment and
assumed that the psychiatric staff was best placed to ensure that the
system operated fairly. He went so far as to suggest that if section
15 were violated, the legislative provisions for compulsory treatment
could be saved under section 15(2) of the Charter which provides for
affirmative action programs for disadvantaged groups or individuals.
Paternalism was prevalent throughout the judgment:
There is nothing oppressive or unconscionable, nothing contrary to public policy to
authorize the state to care for those hapless individuals who, by reason of mental
infirmity and disease, having lost the thread of reality, must be nurtured in a special
way to give their lives some dignity and tranquil times.
9 2
Forced treatment was seen as part of the state's duty to protect the
individual under its care. The exercise of this duty was delegated to
the psychiatric staff:
[Tihe helpless, the incompetent involuntary patient depends entirely upon a
concerned society exemplified by the staff of the psychiatric facility for his care,
treatment and protection. The duty of care owed to the incompetent involuntary
patient is total: as with a child of tender years he demands the ultimate in social
concern.9 3
Tobias D.C.L did acknowledge that substitute consent
providers could make errors in authorizing treatment and even
indicated that the patient may need protection from such mistakes.
90 It should be noted that this decision was handed down before the Supreme Court of
Canada's judgment in Andrews v. The Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143
which rejected the similarly situated analysis that had been applied by lower courts. The
Court also rejected the argument that forced treatment was cruel and unusual treatment under
section 12 of the Charter. It held that administering treatment to a non-consenting patient
under the provisions for substitute consent in the Act was not so excessive as to outrage
standards of decency. Ibd at 435.
91 Fleming v. Reid (1990), 73 O.R. (2d) 169 (Dist. Ct) [hereinafter Fleming].
92 ibid. at 176.
93 Ibid. at 180.
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That protection, however, was seen as emanating from the
psychiatric staff, not from legal safeguards:
iWihere is the protection for the incompetent involuntary patient if the substitute
consent-giver wrongly gives his consent to unwarranted or improper specified
psychiatric treatment? The answer dearly rests in the reliance placed by the Act
upon the professionalism of the physicians making the treatment proposals. If every
treatment decision involving incompetent patients in psychiatric facilities were
challenged and reviewed their treatment would grind to a halt and the patients
would suffer. The efficacy of the decisions of the attending physician with respect
to those specified psychiatric treatments which receive the consent of the substituted
consent giver are wisely left untouched by the provisions of the Act.
9 4
Thus, the same professionals who prescribe the proposed treatment
and seek substitute consent are relied upon to protect the patient
from unwise decisions in favour of treatment.
95
C. Other Cases
The one successful trial level section 15 challenge in the
mental health context involved neither commitment nor treatment,
but rather the rights of persons involved in work projects during
their psychiatric hospitalizations. This case is important because it
illustrates the court's willingness to 'grant relief where it could
analogize to another, less contentious, area of the law.
In Fenton v. Forensic Psychiatric Services Commission,96 the
plaintiff had been a patient at the Forensic Psychiatric Institute
(Fi) in Port Coquitlam, British Columbia since having been found
not guilty by reason of insanity of obstructing a police officer. Mr.
Fenton claimed that he should be entitled to minimum wage for the
work he performed at FPi and that section 8(2)(d) of the
94 Ibid. at 191.
95 With respect to provinces that permit forced treatment of competent patients, it is
interesting to note that, in Fleming, ibia at 180, Tobias D.C.J. was of the view that forced
treatment of competent patients could not be justified:
[Ihere can be no challenge to the right of a competent person to decide how his
or her body is to be touched and treated except in the most extreme cases of
virulent diseases where the universal well-being of the population justifies the
restraints placed on personal liberty of an infected person.
9 6 Supra, note 46.
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Employment Standards Act Regulations97 violated section 15 of
Charter because the provision enabled an employer to avoid
minimum wage legislation "in a' therapeutic work program designed
primarily to facilitate the development of occupational skills for that
disabled person."
The trial judge held that section 8(2)(d) of the Employment
Standards Act Regulations discriminated on the basis of mental
disability and that Mr. Fenton should have received the minimum
wage for his work at Fi. The Court did stress that the
discrimination might be justified under section 1 of the Charter,
but that the Crown had not laid a sufficient evidentiary basis to
meet its burden on this issue. Hence, the regulation was struck
down as unconstitutional. This case has recently been overturned
by the British Columbia Court of Appeal on the basis that inmates
at the Forensic Institute are not employees and therefore are not
entitled to protection under labour standards legislation.98 Counsel
for Mr. Fenton has indicated that leave to appeal to the Supreme
Court of Canada will be sought. 9
D. Discussion
Unlike the American case law, Canadian jurisprudence on
mental health law does not appear to be taking a different approach
to commitment and treatment refusal cases. With a few limited
exceptions, Canadian courts are adopting a paternalistic model for
most aspects of mental health law. The individual before the court
seen as a patient who needs the psychiatric profession to
determine his or her own best interest. The uniqueness of mental
disability is often used to justify the denial of procedural protections
that we would insist upon in other contexts.
Many Canadian courts are adopting what might be referred
to as a presumption of incompetence. The suggestion is that anyone
97 B.C. Reg 37/81, s. 2(d)ii, passed pursuant to the Employment Standards Act, S.B.C.
1980, C. 10.
98 Fenton, supra, note 46.
99 See the Community Legal Assistance Society, Press Release (31 May 1991).
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in a psychiatric facility loses the ability to say whether they belong
there or whether their rights have been violated in the commitment
process. The presumption also has implications for treatment.
Judges often make the assumption that, if a person has been
committed involuntarily, he or she must be incompetent to make
decisions about treatment. If a patient refuses treatment, that is
seen as merely more evidence in support of the patient's illness.
Treatment refusal is seen as a function of incompetence, rather than
as an individual choice. Almost no attention is paid to possible
legitimate reasons for refusing treatment or to the possibility that
the proposed treatment is not in the individual's best interest. The
starting point is that the patient will be better off if on medicatidj4
than if left to suffer the ravages of "mental illness." There is 4
recognition that treatment cannot cure most "mental illnesses," but
the assumption is nonetheless made that pharmacological control of
some symptoms is always preferable to a non-medicated life.100 This
presumption of incompetence, evident in Re Mental Health Act,101
in combination with the assumption that psychiatrists are best
equipped to assess the interests of the incompetent person, leaves
very little role for judicial intervention.
The presumption of incompetence obscures the important
distinction between the criteria for civil commitment and the criteria
for forced treatment. An individual who has been civilly committed
is not necessarily incompetent to make treatment decisions 0 2 The
test for commitment in all Canadian provinces involves some
formulation of whether a person is dangerous to self or to others.
Competence to make treatment decisions relates to the person's
ability to understand the nature of the treatment and to assess its
potential benefits and harms. Suppose, for example, a person
believes that monsters from outer space have ordered him to kill
his children and the person starts to make plans to carry out this
100 Many patients who are treated with these drugs for years still stop taking them when
they have the choice. Surely, this indicates either that the drugs are not really doing what
doctors claim they do (help the patient realize his or her need for medication) or that the
side-effects of drugs for some patients outweigh the benefits.
101 Supra, note 46.
102 The one exception to this is Saskatchewan, where the criteria for commitment include
a finding of incompetence with respect to treatment. See supra, note 83.
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instruction. This person will probably meet a "dangerous to others"
test and thus be committable. Let us suppose further that, once the
person is hospitalized, he refuses psychotropic medication. If the
refusal is based on instructions from the monsters from outer space,
it is likely that the person is not competent to make treatment
decisions. However, if the refusal is based on rational grounds, such
as the unpleasant side-effects that accompanied the same medication
in the past (e.g., shakiness, blurred vision, or memory loss), the
refusal may be unrelated to the reason for involuntary commitment
and may be a competent refusal. The individual could still feel
compelled to carry out the instruction of the monsters, while holding
a reasonable view on the treatment issue. Competence is not an all
or nothing phenomenon. Even persons suffering from mental illness
may be competent to make many decisions about their own lives.
In the criminal law context, the starting point is that an
individual is competent and that his or her alleged criminal actions
were a result of an exercise of free will.103 The presumption of
innocence requires that we presume innocence until guilt has been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. When an individual has not
even been charged with a criminal offence, and yet is facing a
deprivation of liberty as serious as that faced by a criminal accused,
why would incompetence be the starting point? If a court assumes
that any psychiatric patient brought before it is by definition
mentally ill and probably unable to instruct counsel, then the court
is pre-judging the very issues before it. 04
103 See, for example, the presumption of sanity in section 16(4) of the Criminal Code,
supra, note 46.
104 In criminal law, every deprivation of liberty must be reviewed by a court before it
will be allowed to continue over 24 hours. Invasions of privacy through a search, except in
emergency circumstances, must be authorized judicially before they are undertaken. Consider
the following words spoken by then Chief Justice Dickson in Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984]
2 S.C.R. 145 at 161-62:
The purpose of a requirement of prior authorization is to provide an opportunity,
before the event, for the conflicting interests of the State and the individual to be
assessed, so that the individual's right to privacy will be breached only where the
appropriate standard has been met, and the interests of the State are thus
demonstrably superior. For such an authorization procedure to be meaningful it
is necessary for the person authorizing the search to be able to assess the evidence
as to whether that standard has been met in an entirely neutral and impartial
manner.
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The standard of beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal law
is a reflection of the seriousness of the deprivation of liberty for the
accused and a recognition of society's decision to prefer to risk that
guilty persons go free than that innocent persons be convicted.105
In the mental health context, however, courts seem more willing to
apply a less rigorous standard of proof because the state is allegedly
acting to protect rather than to punish. If the function of a burden
of proof is to allocate the risk of error, it must be realized that
mistakes in the mental health law system are often very difficult to
correct. Once someone has been stigmatized as mentally ill and
involuntary commitment has been authorized, it is very difficult for
the patient to assert wrongful commitment. Protests against
commitment are often characterized as "a lack of insight" which is
itself seen as symptomatic of mental illness.
106
The presumption of incompetence seems related to a second
presumption made by courts: the benevolence of involuntary
psychiatric hospitalization and treatment. One Ontario court has
taken this second presumption so far as to say that civil commitment
and forced treatment are forms of affirmative action for the mentally
disabled and thus can be upheld under section 15(2) of the
Charter.107 It is difficult to imagine any other circumstances in
which we would force members of a disadvantaged group (who may
not even think they belong to the group) to accept unwanted
affirmative action. Affirmative action regimes are usually something
that people outside the identified group might want to challenge as
being an unfair benefit to the members of the class in question. It
is absurd to suggest that people without mental disabilities might be
The above passage describes the right to privacy held by a corporation in Canada. It is in
stark contrast to the absence of prior authorization in most provincial mental health statutes.
105 Judges seem to be less afraid of potentially guilty persons going free in the criminal
justice system than of "mentally ill" persons not being detained in the mental health system.
Criminals seem to frighten courts less than persons with mental disabilities. This is so even
in the absence of empirical support for the belief that mentally disabled persons commit more
dangerous or violent acts than the general public. See Cocozza & Steadman, supra, note 4
and Mesnikoff & Lauterbach, supra, note 4.
106 See Rosenhan, supra, note 4 at 254: "Once a person is designated abnormal, all of
his other behaviors and characteristics are colored by that label."
107 See Fleming, supra, note 91.
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able to challenge civil commitment because they too are not entitled
to it. More importantly, section 15(2) deals with affirmative action
that ameliorates the social and political disadvantage experienced by
members of the disadvantaged group. Civil commitment and forced
treatment of persons with mental disabilities (with few procedural
protections) are examples of historical disadvantage, not a means by
which to remedy it.
Why have Canadian courts held so tenaciously to the
paternalistic model of mental health law? Strong communitarian
values, which have historically formed an important part of the
Canadian political tradition, encourage the community to take care
of its members, particularly those who are seen to be needy or to
have diminished capacity. This communitarian ethic is in contrast to
the liberal individualistic ideology that has characterized the
American political tradition.
1 8
The Canadian communitarian tradition is reflected in the
nature of health care in Canada. The state and the practice of
medicine are connected in Canada by the establishment and the
acceptance of socialized medicine. The right to medical care is
considered more fundamental than in a country, such as the United
States, where the practice of medicine is organized as a matter of
private enterprise. Thus, the communitarian ethic and the adoption
10In Politics and the Constitution: The Charter Federalim and the Supreme Court of
Canada (Agincourt, Ont.: Carswell, 1987) at 105, Patrick Monahan describes the strong
communitarian tradition in Canada:
Canadian politics has always placed particular emphasis on communitarian values.
Moreover, Canadians traditionally have regarded the state as a vehicle for creating
individual freedom, rather than as the antithesis of such freedom. Claims for social
justice have been advanced and have succeeded in the political, rather than the
judicial, arena.
Also, in Condnental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada (New
York: Routledge, 1990) at 93, Professor Seymour Martin Lipset describes the contrast
between the constitutions of the two countries:
IT]he concern of Canada's fathers of Confederation with "peace, order, and good
government" implies control of and protection for the society. The parallel stress
by America's founding fathers on "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" suggests
upholding the rights of the individual.
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of socialized medicine may have led Canadian judges to view
"mentally ill" individuals as persons deserving the state's care even if
the individual involved is too "sick" to recognize the need for
hospitalization and/or treatment.1 °9
At the same time as the communitarian ethic is flourishing
in Canadian mental health law, our courts have moved increasingly
toward a liberal analysis in the criminal context, focusing on the
protection of the rights of accused persons. Why has this not spilled
over into mental health law? I would suggest that part of the
reason is that we have socially constructed the criminal trial in a
manner very different from our construction of mental health
proceedings. The adversarial nature of the criminal trial is evident
throughout the process as is the uneven distribution of resources
between the state and the accused person. In stark contrast, legal
action initiated by a person detained in a psychiatric facility is
brought against the hospital or the doctor who is involved in the
detention. The dispute is depicted as being, not between the
individual and the state, but rather between the individual and his
or her doctor. Moreover, the complaint is brought against psychiatry
by someone whose competence is already suspect because he or she
has already been deemed mentally ill by the very psychiatrists being
challenged. If the "patient" loses the case, he or she will not face
imprisonment, but rather hospitalization and/or treatment. The fact
that the physician is an agent of the state and exercising power
expressly delegated from the state is obscured. The power of the
state is masked by the medical model of involuntary psychiatry.
109 A "right to treatment" (a communitarian based right) might receive more sympathetic
treatment from Canadian courts than a "right to refuse treatment" which is based on a more
individualist tradition.
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V. CONCLUSION
Throughout this paper, I have been stressing the power given
to doctors in the context of involuntary psychiatry. Such power
results from a combination of political, legal, and social influences
that shape the way we see persons with mental disabilities.
This power may be enhanced by the nature of mental
disability. Mental disability is a unique form of disadvantage.
Individuals who the state might purport to bring within the category
of mental disability may deny that they belong in the relevant class.
Mental disability is one of the few forms of disadvantage in our
society for which membership in the group is defined largely from
the outside. Decisions as to who is properly within the class are
made by people who are not members of the class.110 In addition
to this external definition of membership, what is in the interests of
persons with mental disabilities is usually defined by persons other
than the individuals themselves. Be it psychiatrists or rights
advocates, many of us are telling individuals with mental disabilities
just what is in their best interests 11 Psychiatrists both define the
110 Of all the enumerated groups in section 15, that of mental disability is probably the
most elusive and difficult to define. Many individuals with mental disabilities also fall within
other disadvantaged groups protected by section 15 and thus may be doubly disadvantaged.
For example, there have been studies conducted in the United States which have found that
women are treated in a discriminatory manner in psychiatric facilities. In "Sex-Based
Discrimination in the Mental Institutionalization of Women" (1974) 62 Calif. L Rev. 789 at
806, Robert T. Roth and Judith Lerner suggest that it is easier for women to get into a
psychiatric hospital and harder for them to get out. The authors suggest that women, who
do not conform to the stereotyped view of what women are supposed to do, are more likely
to face detention and forced treatment. It is also suggested that a woman's chance of being
released from a psychiatric facility is related to "limited education, possession of domestic
skills only, having a spouse or immediate family, and length of stay ... medical diagnosis, and
treatment had no significant effect on the rate of release." See also R. Anand, "Involuntary
Civil Commitment in Ontario: The Need to Curtail the Abuses of Psychiatry" (1979) 57 Can.
Bar Rev. 250 at 259.
111 I realize that I am doing just that in this paper. I am making the assumption that
increased "legal" protections are in themselves a "good" that should be sought by and on behalf
of individuals with mental disabilities. Psychiatrists make different assumptions about the
benefits of compulsory treatment and hospitalization.
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class of persons seen as "mentally disabled" and prescribe how the
class should be treated once defined.112
Rather than provide an effective check on the exercise of
state power by psychiatrists, Canadian courts have enhanced the
power of psychiatrists in their unwillingness to scrutinize the
decisions of the "experts." Courts reason by analogy and thus, when
faced with a new legal issue, they look to old cases and to other
areas of law in an attempt to incorporate any new issue into an
existing legal framework. Where they can draw such analogies, they
are comfortable in asserting their own expertise in deciding disputes
brought before them 1 3  However, when courts face an issue for
which there are no obvious analogies, like the forced treatment of
individuals in psychiatric facilities, they have chosen either to apply
analogies that do not quite work or to renounce their own ability to
resolve the dispute.
In the mental health context, both of these options have
resulted in an extensive delegation of power to psychiatrists. Where
the court is without analogy, it turns to someone it feels is more
equipped to make the decision and delegates extensive power over
commitment and treatment decisions to psychiatrists. When the
courts do find an analogy, the one most often utilized is that of a
helpless child, incapable of making any decisions about his or her
best interests. Adopting this model also leads to a delegation of
decision-making authority to the psychiatrist because he or she is
seen as the person best equipped to care for the ailing individual.
112 Ivan Illich explains in Limits to Medicine: Medical Nemesis: The Expropriation of
Health (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1976) at 6: "Society has transferred to physicians
the exclusive right to determine what constitutes sickness, who is or might become sick, and
what shall be done to such people."
113 Fenton, supra, note 46 is one mental health case where the Court was able to draw
an analogy to a "safer" area of law. While the decision was an important victory in terms of
structuring work programs in institutions (and for disabled persons in general) and in terms
of provincial funding obligations, it is not a typical mental health case. There was no issue
on which the Court had to second guess psychiatric judgments; there was no question of
releasing, or even not treating, any patient as a result of the decision. In other words, the
Court was treading in an area in which courts are commonly known to tread - labour
standards and their equal application. Fenton may be of limited use in helping courts to
determine issues that really are unique to involuntary psychiatry, like commitment or forced
treatment.
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If courts do have to make analogies to deal effectively with
forced commitment and treatment, then the most appropriate
analogy is that of the criminal law. Only this model recognizes the
massive deprivations of liberty involved in forced commitment and
treatment and the coercive nature of involuntary psychiatry in
general. When an individual is "hospitalized" or "treated" without his
or her consent under the auspices of mental health legislation, the
state is exercising one of the most invasive powers known in our
law. State compelled psychiatric treatment is not just a medical
issue, it is also a political and social one.1 14  The state delegates
extensive power to psychiatrists to decide whom we as a society will
deprive of their liberty and of their freedom of thought. The mere
fact that we are depriving a person of liberty purportedly in his or
her own best interest should not allow us to rob the individual
involved of all rights to which he or she would otherwise be entitled.
A person accused of a crime in Canada has far more
protections built into the law than does a person facing civil
commitment. While our system of criminal justice is far from
perfect, we have accepted a system weighted heavily in favour of the
rights of accused persons. We have chosen a rights model in
criminal law because we recognize the seriousness of the deprivation
of liberty facing an accused person. The cost to any accused person
of the system making a mistake is so serious that we need to erect
hurdles over which the state must jump in order to justify
imprisonment. There is a recognition in the criminal context that
the difference in power between the state and the accused person
requires significant legal protections for the accused. Proof beyond
a reasonable doubt and the presumption of innocence serve this
function.
114 History is replete with examples of political abuse being perpetrated through
manipulations of the concept of "mental illness." One glaring example in North American
history occurred as recently as the 1970s. Prior to 1973, the American Psychiatric Association
viewed homosexuality as a mental disorder. After holding a referendum of its members in
1973, homosexuality was removed from the diagnostic manual of the Association. Had the
Association voted differently, presumably homosexuality would still be seen as a form of
mental illness. See the American Psychiatric Association, "Position Statement on
Homosexuality and Civil Rights" (1974) 131 Am. . Psych. 497. For a disturbing account of
the misuse of psychiatry for political purposes in the Soviet Union, see R. . Bonnie, "Coercive
Psychiatry and Human Rights: An Assessment of Recent Changes in the Soviet Union" (1990)
1 Crim. L Forum 319.
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Given the serious consequences ensuing from civil
commitment and involuntary treatment, we must insist on similar
hurdles in the context of involuntary psychiatry. Mistakes in the
commitment context can have serious and potentially irreversible
consequences for the individual. Doctors, like any other persons
exercising force under state authority, must be required to justify
their decisions and to subject those decisions to careful scrutiny by
an independent body. Putting hurdles in front of doctors making
commitment and treatment decisions could well improve the quality
of their decision-making and force them to resort to involuntary
commitment and treatment only when absolutely necessary.115
Increased procedural protections might slow down and on
occasion interfere with the smooth running of psychiatric facilities.
Involuntary treatment might be delayed and some patients could
suffer as a result. However, no system that exercises as much power
as is involved in decisions to commit and to treat forcibly should be
allowed to function unimpeded without any accountability to
outsiders or any examination of the fairness of its decision-making.
I am not suggesting that courts are the best institution to be
making detailed decisions about what kinds of treatment detained
individuals should undergo. Rather, I am suggesting that courts are
competent to scrutinize the judgments of experts to ensure that they
are being applied in a manner consistent with the constitutional
rights to which all Canadians are entitled. Judges are often called
upon to evaluate expert evidence; the mental health context should
be no different. In the words of one American judge:
Very few judges are psychiatrists. But equally few are economists, aeronautical
engineers, atomic scientists, or marine biologists. For some reason, however, many
people seem to accept judicial scrutiny of, say, the effect of a proposed dam on fish
life, while they reject similar scrutiny of the effect of psychiatric treatment on
human lives. Since it can hardly be said that we are more concerned for the
salmon than the schizophrenic, I suspect the explanation must lie in our familiarity
115 Procedural protections are not only a means to a fairer decision making process, they
also reflect the degree of respect and concern given by the state to the individual facing a
deprivation of liberty. In Constitutional Choices (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1985) at 13, Professor LH. Tribe comments: "If process is constitutionally valued,
therefore, it must be valued not only as a means to some independent end, but for its intrinsic
characteristics: being heard is part of what it means to be a person."
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with judicial supervision of such matters as railroad rates, airplane design, power
plant construction and dam-building. While the importance of this factor can be
overestimated, in the law as in all other areas we tend to accept the accustomed
and fear the new.
1 1 6
116 D. Bazelon, "Implementing the Right to Treatment" (1969) 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 742
at 743.
After this paper went to press, the Ontario Court of Appeal handed down a
landmark ruling on the right to refuse treatment. In Fleming v. Reid; Fleming v. Gallagher,
(28 June 1991), 357/90, 356/90 (Ont. CA.), a unanimous Court struck down the provisions
of the Ontario Mental Health Act which empowered the review board to override treatment
refusals of a substitute decision-maker. In both cases before the Court, the individuals
involved were detained by way of a Lieutenant Governor's Warrant, rather than through the
civil commitment process. Both were deemed presently incompetent to make treatment
decisions, but had previously, while competent, indicated a desire to refuse anti-psychotic
medication. It was on this basis that their substitute decision-maker denied consent on behalf
of both men. The Court held that it was unconstitutional for the review board to make its
decision on the basis of the "best interests of the patient," rather than on the expressed wishes
of the men when competent.
The case specifically limits the ability to forcibly treat an incompetent person, when
that person has previously expressed a competent wish to refuse treatment. The case will also
have major implications for all provinces that allow forced treatment of individuals who are
competent to make treatment decisions and, if followed, could result in striking down
legislation in Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, the
Northwest Territories, and the Yukon. The decision is consistent with the analysis in this
paper because the Court recognized the intrusiveness of forced treatment as well as the right
of all individuals to make choices for themselves, even if those choices may not be in the best
interests of the individual involved.
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